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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On appeal, Mr. Wright asserted that his due process rights to a fair trial and the
presumption of innocence were violated when the court placed him in restraints and
informed the jury about the restraints, and that he was deprived of his due process right
to a fair trial when the prosecutor elicited testimony that he invoked his Fourth
Amendment right and referred to that invocation in his opening statement and closing
argument.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State has argued, with respect to the restraint
issue, that Mr. Wright failed to preserve his arguments at trial.

As such, the State

argues, Mr. Wright must satisfy the fundamental error test announced in State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209 (2010), which the State argues he has failed to do.
This Reply Brief is necessary to demonstrate that Mr. Wright did preserve his
arguments concerning the use of restraints at trial, and, therefore, this Court should
reject the State's attempt to shift the analysis to one of fundamental error.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Wright's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did Mr. Wright preserve for appeal his arguments about the use of restraints at trial?
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ARGUMENT
Mr. Wright Preserved For Appeal His Arguments About The Use Of Restraints At Trial
In its Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that Mr. Wright's claims of error with
respect to the district court's decision to place him in restraints without holding a
hearing, alerting the jury to the fact of the restraints, and failing to use the least visible
restraints possible were not preserved for appeal. If the claims were not preserved, the
State argues that Mr. Wright must satisfy the fundamental error test set forth in State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), which he failed to do.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-12.)

Because Mr. Wright objected at trial, thereby preserving his arguments for appeal, the
State's argument is without merit.
During a hearing at which Mr. Wright fired his attorney and went pro se, the
district court announced that it had ordered that Mr. Wright be restrained because of
reports from "the Marshal that Mr. Wright has become combative and threatening to the
Marshal." Prior to the jury being returned to the courtroom, Mr. Wright requested that
the restraints be removed, specifically asking, "May I have these off, sir?"

(Tr.Vol.l,

p.49, Ls.14-18, p.57, L.7.) Even the State, in its briefing, acknowledges, "Before the
jury was brought in Wright asked for removal of the restraints, but the court declined" to
grant his request.

(Respondent's Brief, p.4.) The State's argument that Mr. Wright

failed to object is, therefore, contradicted by the record and its own acknowledgment of
the events that occurred below.1 The State's specific claims that Mr. Wright failed to
preserve the three issues surrounding the use of restraints at trial should be rejected for
this reason and for the reasons set forth below.
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The State's first argument is that the district court's failure to hold a hearing on its
decision to restrain him was not preserved below because Mr. Wright failed to object,
failed to request a hearing, and did not dispute the district court's stated reasons for
restraining him. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-9.) This argument is unpersuasive.
First, an examination of the hearing at which the district court announced that it
had ordered Mr. Wright to be restrained reveals that, at the first logical opportunity to do
so, Mr. Wright requested that his restraints be removed. Immediately upon going back
on the record, while the jury remained out of the courtroom, the district court
announced,
During our recess I am informed by the Marshal that Mr. Wright has
become combative and threatening to the Marshal and I have authorized,
as a result of that, that he be restrained and continue to be restrained until
further order. I am also informed when Mr. Mallard, who has conferred
with Mr. Wright, that he has expressed a desire to discharge Mr. Mallard
and to proceed to represent himself in this proceeding, which is his right, if
he desires.
Is that correct, Mr. Wright?
(TrVol,l, p.49, Ls.14-23.)
After confirming that Mr. Wright understood that he was seeking to discharge his
counsel, the district court immediately launched into a Faretta 2 hearing, asking
questions solely concerned with Mr. Wright's understanding of his right to be
represented by counsel and informing him of the disadvantages of self-representation,
before discharging defense counsel from the case. (TrVol.I, p.49, L.24 - p.55, L.12.)
Once that portion of the hearing was concluded, the district court asked the State and

1 Because Mr. Wright preserved his issues for appeal, he will not address the State's
arguments that the district court's rulings did not meet the fundamental error standard.
2 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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Mr. Wright whether either needed to address anything else before bringing the jury
back. Mr. Wright then moved for an opportunity to cross-examine the witness who had
testified prior to the hearing. The district court agreed to allow for cross-examination,
and asked the bailiff to bring the jury back in, at which point Mr. Wright asked, "May I
have these off, sir?" This request was denied. (TrVol,I, p.55, L.13 - p.5?, L.13.)
The State's claim that Mr. Wright was given "ample opportunity '" to challenge
the evidence that he had been combative and threatening" is contradicted by the record,
as discussed above. The district court announced that it had already made its decision,
Mr. Wright objected to the district court's decision, and the district court declined to
reconsider its decision. It is difficult to imagine a better example of a person, let alone
one proceeding pro se, doing a better job of preserving an objection to a district court's
decision.
The State's brief does not set forth the "magic words" that it appears to believe
are necessary to preserve an objection to a district court's decision to place a person in
restraints during a jury trial, although, quoting Idaho case law, the State has written, "[I]f
'counsel for the accused desires to object to the defendant being brought before the
court in leg restraints, he or she should do so before the jurors arrive or after requesting
a hearing outside the presence of the jury.'" (Respondent's Brief, p.? (quoting State v.
Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 105 (Ct. App. 1992).)

Again citing to Knutson, the State

proclaims, "It is the defendant's burden to object prior to being seen by the jury."
(Respondent's Brief, p.8 (citing Knutson at 105).) Even under the State's reading of the
case law on this issue then, Mr. Wright preserved the issue for appellate review.
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The State's next claim is that Mr. Wright failed to preserve his claim that it was
error for the district court to inform the jury as to the use of restraints. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.9-10.) The State makes much of the fact that, aside from his unsuccessful
request that the restraints be removed before the jury saw him so restrained, Mr. Wright
failed to object or move for a mistrial after the district court informed the jury about the
restraints. (Respondent's Brief, p.9.)
A party is not required to continue to object following an adverse ruling on an
issue to preserve that issue for appeal. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v.
MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,494 (2009) ("If the trial court unqualifiedly rules on
the admissibility of evidence prior to trial, no further objection is necessary in order to
preserve the issue for appeal") (citing Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697 (2005».
Here, Mr. Wright did exactly what Knutson requires: he objected prior to the jury being
made aware of the fact that he was restrained. It was unnecessary for him to continue
to object or to move for a mistrial once the issue had been ruled upon.
Additionally, the State appears to ignore the requirement that restraining a
defendant during a jury trial should be done "in a manner that would not be prejudicial."
Knutson at 106 (citing State v. Moen, 94 Idaho 477 (1971».

In Knutson, the district

court employed methods designed to ensure that the jury was not made aware of the
fact that Knutson was restrained, specifically, having him brought into the courtroom
through the judge's chambers and placing a "protective covering in front of both counsel
tables, so that the jury would not be able to see the [leg] restraints." Id.
The State's final argument is that Mr. Wright failed to preserve for appeal his
claim that the district court erred by not using the least visible means of restraint (and

6

that the trial court's decision in this regard did not meet the standard required to find
fundamental error). (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) The State's claim is without merit
in light of the fact that Mr. Wright objected to the use of the actual restraints that were
used, and the district court made no attempt to prevent the jury from learning about the
restraints, let alone attempt to use the least visible restraints possible. As the State
notes in its argument against his claim that telling the jury about the restraints was
improper,
The record does not indicate that the jury was or would have remained
unaware of the restraints. To the contrary, the district court informed the
jury informed the jury [sic] of the reason for the restrains [sic] "so there's
no question as far as what's going on" (Trial Tr., p.58, Ls.3-6), strongly
indicating that the district court was aware that the jury would see the
restraints. Thus, there is nothing clear in the record that the court could
have avoided any potential prejudice arising from the use of restraints by
merely not commenting on them.
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.)
Case law from other jurisdictions cited in Mr. Wright's Appellant's Brief
(Appellant's

Brief,

p.11),

and

recognized

in

the

State's

Respondent's

Brief

(Respondent's Brief, p.11), hold that a trial court ordering the use of restraints must use
the "least visible secure restraint, such as, it is often suggested, leg shackles made
invisible to the jury by a curtain at the defense table." Stephenson v. Wilson, 619 F.3d
664, 668-69

(ih Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484 (ih Cir. 1997)).

Additionally, as the State recognizes, Idaho law prohibits the use of "any more restraint
than is necessary" when bringing a criminal defendant to trial.

(Respondent's Brief,

p.11 (citing Idaho Code § 19-108 and State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288 (Ct. App. 1998)).)
Because Mr. Wright objected to the use of restraints during his jury trial, he
preserved for appellate review all three of his arguments regarding the use of those
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restraints.

As such, the fundamental error test is not applicable, and the State's

arguments that Mr. Wright failed to satisfy the fundamental error test should be rejected.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Wright
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand this matter for a
new trial.
DATED this 28 th day of December, 2011.
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SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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